Internet Filtering in China in 2004 2005 

unauthorized public disclosure by electronic messaging service providers.

144

  Users whose personal 

information is disclosed, in violation of this provision, can sue for damages and injunctive relief.

145

Similarly, it is illegal to use computer information systems to steal or disrupt others' information or 

jeopardize the lawful interests of citizens; violators risk civil penalties.

146

User communications also enjoy protection, at least in theory.  Regulations affirm the freedom 

and privacy of users' e mails and ban others from infringing upon their privacy.  Violators who illegally 

intercept, modify, or delete others' e mails face criminal liability.

147

  Even compulsory seizure of e mails 

and other private telecommunications by the state is limited, according to the laws, to instances where the 

public security authority, public procurator authority, or the national security authority must do so to 

investigate a national security threat or criminal conduct.

148

  Such seizures are formally governed by 

specific criminal procedure requirements.

149

However, the state possesses the power to regulate Internet content and to demand that ISPs and 

Internet Content Providers (ICPs) turn over personal information of Internet users who violate the laws 

or post prohibited content (a term defined broadly).  Upon official request, an ISP or ICP must provide 

the user's name, IP address, e mail address, user name, information on any changes in IP address and 

use, and all data saved by the service provider's computer when the prohibited content or illegal conduct 

took place, including time, content, originating source, and system logs.

150

Thus, while China ostensibly provides some protection to users in the form of legally guaranteed 

rights, these safeguards rarely function in practice. 

3. T

EST ING 

M

ET HODOLOGY

A. Methods 

ONI performs technical testing across multiple levels of access at multiple time intervals in a 

number of regions around the world.  The team analyzes results within the contextual framework of the 

target state's filtering technology, law, and regulations.  To obtain meaningful, accurate results we seek to:  

generate lists of domain names and URLs that have been or are likely to be blocked, based upon 

background research into relevant social and political issues in China; 

enumerate ISPs and national routing topography; 

determine the type, location, and behavior of the filtering technology; 

144

 Article 12, Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Service Provisions. 

145

 Article 19, Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Service Provisions. 

146

 Article 25, Protection of the Safety of Computer Data Systems Regulations; Article 58(2), Telecommunications 

Regulations. 

147

 Article 4.2, Internet Security Decision. 

148

 Article 66, Telecommunications Regulations. 

149

 Article 116, Criminal Procedure Law. 

150

 Ministry of Public Security, Questions Relevant to the Implementation of the Circular.  

19