seemingly neutral regulations that attempt to advance governmental interests unrelated to the 

suppression of free speech.

7

Given this background, any efforts to restrict  telemarketing  must account for the fact 

that newspaper publishers, cable television system operators, Web providers and other content 

providers rely heavily on telephone contacts with customers and potential customers to inform 

them of news and editorial content, and of the availability and modes of distribution of that 

information.  Telemarketing restrictions, both generally and in the particular details of the 

Commission's proposed Rule, do not serve to limit only ordinary commercial transactions for 

consumer goods and services.  Instead, these rules restrict the constitutionally protected ability of 

speakers to alert people to the content of publications, and to distribute their content to both new 

and existing consumers of media services.  The Commission should recognize that telemarketing 

restrictions that limit the ability of CEI and other media companies to distribute core protected 

speech pose constitutional considerations that differ significantly from the constitutional 

implications of restrictions on telephone calls peddling home repair services, time share 

vacations or health club memberships.

  8

These considerations lie at the heart of the categorical newspaper industry exemption 

sought by the Newspaper Association of America   a proposal that CEI fully supports.  ut they 

also merit careful consideration of every facet of the proposed amended Rule that could limit the 

7

 This basic proposition is true of a government permitting scheme that uses supposed cost based fees to restrict 

speech, 

Cox v. New Hampshire

, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941) (striking down excessive fee imposed on expression of 

speech); it is true of seemingly neutral rules that have the effect of unreasonably restricting expression or 

distribution of protected expression, 

Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n

, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) 

(holding that even neutral time, place and manner restrictions must meet a heightened reasonableness standard when 

implicating protected speech); and it is particularly true when the government seeks to limit only one method of 

press distribution or one type of commercial speech about the availability of media publications, 

City of Lakewood v. 

Plain Dealer Pub. Co.,

 486 U.S. 750, 751 (1988) (striking down newsrack licensing plan).  

3